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Abstract
Modern online platforms rely on effective rating systems to learn about items. We con-
sider the optimal design of rating systems that collect binary feedback after transactions. We
make three contributions. First, we formalize the performance of a rating system as the speed
with which it recovers the true underlying ranking on items (in a large deviations sense), ac-
counting for both items’ underlying match rates and the platform’s preferences. Second, we
provide an efficient algorithm to compute the binary feedback system that yields the highest
such performance. Finally, we show how this theoretical perspective can be used to empirically
design an implementable, approximately optimal rating system, and validate our approach using
real-world experimental data collected on Amazon Mechanical Turk.
1 Introduction
Rating and ranking systems are everywhere, from online marketplaces (e.g., 5 star systems where
buyers and sellers rate each other) to video platforms (e.g., thumbs up/down systems on YouTube
and Netflix). However, they are uninformative in practice [26]. One recurring pattern is that ratings
binarize – most raters only use the extreme choices on the rating scale, and the vast majority of
ratings receive the best possible rating. For example, 75% of reviews on Airbnb receive a perfect
rating of 5 stars [14]. Furthermore, several platforms have adopted a binary rating system, in which
a user rates her experience as either positive or negative. Given the prevalence of binary feedback
(either de facto or by design), in this work we investigate the optimal design of such binary rating
systems so that the platform can learn as fast as possible about the items being rated.
The rating pipeline often works as follows: A buyer enters a platform and matches with an item
(e.g. selects a video on Youtube, is paired with a driver on Uber, or selects a home on AirBnB). She
has an experience (e.g. a view, ride, or stay). Then, the platform asks her to rate her experience,
i.e. it asks her a question. In a binary system, she indicates whether her experience was positive
or negative. She then leaves. The platform uses the ratings it has received to score the quality of
items, potentially showing such scores to future buyers.
By designing such a system, we mean: the platform can influence how the buyer rates – how
likely she is to give a positive rating, conditional on the quality of her experience. It can do so
by asking her different questions, e.g. “Was this experience above average” or “Was this experience
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the worst you’ve ever had?”. Different questions shift the probabilities at which items of various
qualities receive positive ratings.
Our first question is: what is the structure of optimal binary feedback? A rating system in
which every buyer gives positive ratings after each match, independent of item quality, will fail
to learn anything about the items. Clearly, better items should be more likely to receive positive
ratings than worse ones. But how much more likely?
Informally, suppose we have a set of items that match with buyers over time (at potentially
differing rates), and we wish to rank the items by their true quality θi ∈ [0, 1]. The platform cannot
observe θi, however. Rather, in our model, after each match, an item with quality θi receives
a positive rating with probability β(θi), and negative otherwise. In other words, the platform
observes, for each item i, a sequence of ratings that are each Bernoulli(β(θi)). Such ratings are
the only knowledge the platform has about items. The platform ranks the items according to the
percentage of its ratings (samples) that were positive. The function β : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] affects how
quickly the platform learns the true ranking, and it prefers to maximize the learning rate. We show
how to calculate an optimal β.
As an example, consider three items with qualities θa > θb > θc, and β such that β(θa) = 0.5
and β(θc) = 0.1, i.e. item a gets positive ratings after 50% of its matches, and item c after 10% of
its matches. It is unclear what β(θb) should be. Trivially, .1 < β(θb) < .5. Otherwise, even with
infinitely many ratings the items will be mis-ranked.
But can we be more precise? If β(θb) = .49, it will take many ratings of both items a and
b to learn that θa > θb, but only a few from c to learn that θc < θb. That may be good if the
platform wants to identify the worst item, but not if it wants to identify the best. It may also be
fine if items a and b match much more often with buyers than item c. Clearly, the optimal value for
β(θb) is objective and context dependent. Of course, the problem becomes more challenging with
more items i for which β(θi) must be chosen. Lastly, in this example, one might intuitively think
β(θb) = 0.3 is optimal by symmetry when the items matter equally and matching rates are identical.
This guess is incorrect. The optimal is β(θb) ≈ 0.28, due to the nature of binomial variance.
In this work, we first formalize the above problem and show how to find an optimal β(θ), jointly
for a set of items [0, 1]. β changes with the platform’s objective and underlying item matching rates.
Jumping ahead, Figure 1 shows optimal β in various settings under our model. For a platform that
wants to find the worst sellers, for example, the top half of items should each get positive ratings
at least 80 + % of the time; it is more important for the bottom half of items to be separated from
one another, i.e. get positive ratings at differing percentages.
Once we have calculated the optimal rating function β (given context on the platform goals and
matching rates), what should we do with it?
Our second question is: How does a platform build a rating system such that buyers behave
near-optimally, i.e. according to a calculated β? The platform cannot directly control buyer rating
behavior. Rather, it has to ask questions such that, for each item quality θ, a fraction β(θ) of raters
will give the item a positive rating. For example, by asking, “Is this the best experience you’ve
had,” the platform would induce behavior such that β(θ) is small for most θ. Most platforms today
ask vague questions (e.g. thumbs up/down), and items mostly get positive ratings. We show this
is highly suboptimal for ranking items quickly.
Our main contributions and paper outline are:
Rating system design as information maximization. In Sections 3.1-3.2, we formulate
the design of rating systems as an information maximization problem. In particular, a good rating
system recovers the true ranking over items, and converge quickly in the number of ratings.
Computing an optimal rating feedback function β. In Section 3.3, we develop an efficient
algorithm that calculates the optimal rating function β, which depends on matching rates and
2
the platform objective. The optimal β provides quantitative insights and principled comparisons
between designs.
Real-world system design. In Section 4, we show how a platform can use a simple experiment
and existing data to empirically design a near-optimal rating system, and to audit the current sys-
tem. In Section 5, we demonstrate the value of this approach through an experiment on Mechanical
Turk.
2 Related work
Many empirical and model-based works document and tackle challenges in existing rating systems [3,
4, 6, 13–15, 19, 21, 26, 29, 30, 33]. To our knowledge, we are the first to formalize a rating system
design problem and then show how one can use empirical data to optimize such systems. In a
related paper [16], we test behavioral insights using an experiment on a large online labor platform
and develop a related design problem for a multiple-choice system, which proves far less tractable.
Other works also optimize platform learning rates [1, 2, 5, 20, 22, 27]. When prescriptive, they
modify which matches occur, while we view the matching process as given and modify the rating
system. The solutions are complementary.
Many bandits works also seek to rank items from a sequence of observations [23, 24, 28, 32].
Our problem is the inverse of the bandit setting: given an arm-pulling policy, we design each arm’s
feedback.1 Our specific theoretical framework is similar to that of Glynn and Juneja [17], who
optimize a large deviations rate to derive an arm-pulling policy for best arm identification.
The “twenty questions” interpretation of Shannon entropy [7, 9] seeks questions that can identify
an item from its distribution. Dagan et al. [9] show how to almost match the performance of Huffman
codes with only comparison and equality questions. Our work differs in two key respects: first, we
seek to rank a set of items as opposed to identifying a single item; second, we consider non-adaptive
policies (i.e. the platform cannot change its rating form in response to what it knows about an item
already).
3 Model and optimization
We now formalize our model and show how to optimize the rating function to maximize the learning
rate. We focus on finding an optimal β : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], a map from item quality θ to the probability
it should receive a positive rating. This section requires no data: we characterize the optimal system.
3.1 Model and problem specification
Our model is constructed to emphasize the rating system’s learning rate. Time is discrete (k =
0, 1, 2, . . .). Informally: there is a set of items. Each time step, buyers match with the items and
leave a rating according to β(θ). The platform records the ratings and ranks the items. Formally:
Items. The system consists of a set [0, 1] of items, where each item is associated with a unique
(but unknown) quality θ ∈ [0, 1]; i.e., the system consists of a continuum of a unit mass of items
whose unknown qualities are uniform2 in [0, 1]. Below, we discretize the continuous quality space
[0, 1] into M types, to calculate a stepwise increasing β. We will make clear why we introduce a
continuum but then discretize.
1Note that a rating is not the same as a reward; buyers often give positive ratings after bad experiences.
2Any distribution can be handled by considering θ to be the item’s quantile rather than its absolute quality.
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Matching with buyers. Items accumulate ratings over time by matching with buyers. We
assume the existence of a nondecreasing match function g(θ), where item θ receives nk(θ) = bkg(θ)c
matches, and thus ratings, up to time k. In other words, item θ is matched approximately every
1
g(θ) time steps. g(θ) ≤ 1 and bounded away from 0, i.e. ∃c > 0: g(θ) > c. This accumulation
captures the feature that better items may be more likely to match.
Ratings. The key quantity for our subsequent analysis is the probability of a positive rating for
each θ, β(θ) , Pr(positive rating|θ). Let y`(θ) ∼ Bernoulli(β(θ)) be the rating an item of quality θ
receives at the `th time it matches.
Aggregating ratings and ranking sellers. These ratings are aggregated into a reputation
score, xk(θ), at each time k. The score is the fraction of positive ratings received up to time k:
xk(θ) , 1nk(θ)
∑nk(θ)
`=0 y`(θ) with x0(θ) , 0 for all θ. Thus, xk(θ) ∼ 1nk(θ)Binomial(β(θ), nk(θ)).
System state. The state of the system is given by a joint distribution µk(Θ, X), which gives the
mass of items of quality θ ∈ Θ ⊂ [0, 1] with aggregate score xk(θ) ∈ X ⊂ [0, 1] at time k. Because
our model is a continuum, the evolution of the system state µk follows a deterministic dynamical
system.
We have described these dynamics at the level of individual items; however, such statements
should be interpreted as describing the evolution of the joint distribution µk. The state update for
µk is determined by the mass of items that match and the distributions of their ratings. A formal
description of the state evolution is in Appendix Section B.1.
Platform objective. The platform wishes to rank the items accurately. Given β and θ1 > θ2,
define:
Pk(θ1, θ2|β) =µk
(
xk(θ1) > xk(θ2)|θ1, θ2
)− µk(xk(θ1) < xk(θ2)|θ1, θ2) (1)
This expression captures observed score ranking’s accuracy. When θ1 > θ2 but xk(θ1) < xk(θ2), the
ranking mistakenly orders θ1 below θ2. A good system has large Pk(θ1, θ2|β). Integrating across
items creates the following objective for each time k:
Wk =
∫
θ1>θ2
w(θ1, θ2)Pk(θ1, θ2|β)dθ1dθ2 (2)
Weight function w(θ1, θ2) > 0 indicates how much the platform cares about not mistaking a quality
θ1 item with a quality θ2 item. We consider scaled w such that
∫
θ1>θ2
w(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2 = 1.
Our first question then becomes: What β yields the highest value of Wk? As discussed above,
the platform influences β through the design of its rating system. The optimal choice of β sets the
benchmark.
Discussion. Objective function. The specification (2) of the objective is quite rich. It contains
scaled versions of Kendall’s τ (with w(θ1, θ2) = 1 for all θ1, θ2) and Spearman’s ρ (with w(θ1, θ2) =
θ1 − θ2) rank correlations. w allows the platform to encode, for example, that it cares more about
correctly ranking just the very best, very worst, or items at both extremes.3 Tarsitano [31] and
da Costa and Roque [8] discuss other well-studied examples.
Relationship between model components. Qualitatively, β affects Wk as follows, as previewed in
the introduction: when β(θ1) ≈ β(θ2), then xk(θ1) ≈ xk(θ2), and so Pk(θ1, θ2|β) is small (errors are
common). A good design thus would have large β(θ1)− β(θ2) for θ1 > θ2 where w(θ1, θ2) is large.
Matching function g also affects Pk and thusWk: when g(θ) is large, more ratings are sampled from
item of quality θ, i.e. nk(θ) is higher, and so xk(θ) is more closely concentrated around its mean
β(θ). Thus, Pk(θ, θ′|β) increases (for all θ′) with g(θ). A good design of β thus considers both w
and g.
3We use θ1θ2(θ1 − θ2), (1− θ1)(1− θ2)(θ1 − θ2), and ( 12 − θ1)2( 12 − θ2)2(θ1 − θ2) as examples.
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Figure 1: Optimal β (with M = 200) with various objective weight functions w and matching rates
g.
Matching. As noted above, we assume items receive a non-decreasing number of ratings based
on their true quality, through matching function g(θ). This is a reasonable approximation for our
analysis, where we focus on the asymptotic rate of convergence of the ranking based on to the true
ranking, as the number of ratings increases. In practice, items will be more likely to match when
they have a higher observed aggregate score. Similarly, our model makes the stylized choice that all
items have the same age. In reality, items have different ages in platforms.
Non-response. In practice, many buyers choose not to rate items, which our model does not
capture. One possible approach is to treat non-response as a bad experience, which yields more
information in the work of Nosko and Tadelis [26]. Solutions to non-response is an important area
of work.
3.2 Large deviations & discretization
Recall the question: What β yields the highest value of Wk?. We now refine objective Wk and
constrain β to form a non-degenerate, feasible optimization task.
Large deviation rate function. Wk is not one objective: it has a different value per time k,
and no single β simultaneously optimizes Wk for all k.4 Considering asymptotic performance is also
insufficient: when β is strictly increasing in θ, limk→∞ Pk(θ1, θ2|β) = 1 ∀θ1, θ2 by the law of large
numbers. Thus, W , limk→∞Wk = 1, and any such β is asymptotically optimal.
For this reason, we consider maximization of the rate at whichWk converges, i.e., how fast the es-
timated item ranking converges to the true item ranking. We use a large deviations approach [10] to
quantify this convergence rate. Formally, given sequence Yk ≤ limk→∞ Yk = Y , the large deviations
rate of convergence is − limk→∞ 1k log(Y − Yk) = c. If c exists then Yk approaches Y exponentially
fast: Y − Yk = e−kc+o(k).
Then, we wish to choose β to maximizeWk’s large deviations rate, r = − limk→∞ 1k log(W−Wk).
Discretizing β. Unfortunately, even this problem is degenerate if we consider continuous β: for
any β that is not piecewise constant, the large deviations rate of convergence is zero, i.e., convergence
of Wk to its limit is only polynomially fast, and characterizing the dependence of this convergence
4For example, consider β such that the worst half of items never receive a positive rating and the rest always
do. It would perform comparatively well for a small number of ratings k, as it quickly distinguishes the best from
the worst items. However it would never distinguish items within the same half. Some β′ may make more mistakes
initially but perform better at larger k.
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rate on β is intractable. Thus, the rate of convergence for Wk is not a satisfactory objective with
continuous β.
We make progress by discretizing β; in particular, we restrict attention to optimization over
stepwise increasing β functions.5 Among stepwise increasing β, the large deviations rate of Wk to
its limiting value W can be shown to be nondegenerate, i.e. ∃c > 0 s.t. W −Wk = e−kc+o(k). (See
Lemma C.4 in the Appendix for further discussion.)
Notationally, we will calculate an optimal stepwise increasing β with M levels, i.e. there are M
intervals Si ⊂ [0, 1] and levels ti such that when θ1, θ2 ∈ Si, then β(θ1) = β(θ2) , ti. The challenge
is calculating an optimal S∗ = {Si} and t∗ = {ti}.
The physical interpretation is that we group the items into M subsets (types) Si ⊂ [0, 1].
When items θ1, θ2 are in the same subset, then their asymptotic reputation scores are the same,
limk xk(θ1) = limk xk(θ2) , ti. These items cannot be distinguished from one another even asymp-
totically.
Though discretization allows us to define a large deviations rate for Wk, it comes at a cost: W ,
the limiting value of Wk, is no longer one. Different discretization choices S result in different W .
Our optimization problem: Within the class of stepwise increasing functions with M levels,
find the β that is optimal, i.e. is
(1) Asymptotically optimal. It yields the highest limiting value of Wk. AND
(2) Rate optimal. It yields the fastest large deviations rate r among asymptotically optimal β.
A remarkable result of our paper is a O (M log2 M ) procedure to find an optimal β with M
levels.
3.3 Solving the optimization problem
The theorem below shows that the problem decomposes into two stages: first, find optimal dis-
cretization intervals S∗; then, find optimal t∗ given S∗.
Theorem 3.1. The β defined by the following choices of S∗ and t∗ is optimal:
S∗ = arg max
∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj w(θ1, θ2)d(θ1, θ2)
t∗ = arg max r(t), where6 gi , infθ∈Si g(θ) and
r(t) , − lim
k→∞
1
k
log(W −Wk) (3)
= min
0≤i≤M−2
inf
a∈R
{gi+1KL(a||ti+1) + giKL(a||ti)}
The proof is in the Appendix. The main hurdle is showing that the continuum of rates for
Pk(θ1, θ2) for each pair θ1, θ2 translates into a rate for Wk. This decomposition separates our two
questions: S∗ maximizes the limiting value of Wk given any t, and depends only on w; Then, t∗
maximizes the rate at which the limiting value is reached, given gi.
For Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ, the optimal intervals are simply equispaced in [0, 1], i.e.
S∗i = [
i
M ,
i+1
M ), because the entire item quality distribution is equally important. For other objective
weight functions w, the difficulty of finding the optimal subsets S∗ depends on the properties of w.
Since S∗ is trivial for Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ – and w is just an analytic tool that formalizes
a platform’s goals – we focus on finding the optimal levels t∗.
Discussion. One may naturally wonder why we introduced a continuum of quality [0, 1] and
then discretized into M subsets, instead of starting with M types. As established in Theorem 3.1,
5Note that, even for purely computational reasons, calculating β requires discretization.
6KL(a||b) = a log b
a
+ (1− a) log 1−b
1−a is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between Bernoulli random variables
with success probabilities a and b respectively.
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how we discretize (i.e. solving for S∗) allows for optimization of different objective weight functions
w; it determines which items are most valuable to distinguish.
Suppose we started with a set of M items. Then the only remaining challenge is to equalize
the rates at which each item is separated from others: the large deviations rate is unaffected by
the weight function w (it does not appear in the simplification of r(t)). In other words, given
a discrete set of M items (equiv, given S∗), calculating the optimal t is equivalent to solving a
maximin problem for the rates at which each type is distinguished from each of the others. Thus,
the algorithm below also solves the inverse bandits problem in which we wish to rank the M arms,
and we can choose the structure of the (binary) observations at each arm.
We further note that the choice ofM is not consequential; in the Appendix Section B.4 we show
that in an appropriate sense, a sequence of optimal βM for each M converges as M gets large.
Algorithm to find the optimal levels We now describe how to find t∗, the maximizer of r(t).
The following lemma describes a system of equations to find the t∗ that maximizes r. It states
that t∗ equalizes the rates at which each interval i is separated from its neighbors. The proof
involves manipulation of r and convexity, and is in the appendix.
Lemma 3.1. The unique solution t∗ to the following system of equations maximizes r(t):
r(t0, t1) = r(t1, t2) = · · · = r(tM−2, tM−1) (4)
t0 = 0, tM−1 = 1
r(ti−1, ti) , − log
[(
(1− ti−1)
gi−1
gi−1+gi (1− ti)
gi
gi−1+gi + ti−1
gi−1
gi−1+gi ti
gi
gi−1+gi
)gi−1+gi]
We do not know of any algorithm that efficiently and provably solves such convex equality
systems in general. However, we leverage some structure in our setting to develop an algorithm,
NestedBisection, with run-time and optimality guarantees. The efficiency of our algorithm results
from the property that, given a rate, ti is uniquely determined by the value of either of the adjacent
levels ti−1, ti+1, reducing an exponentially large search space to an almost linear one. Physically,
i.e., we only need to separate each type of item from its neighboring types.
Below we include pseudo-code. Akin to branch and bound, the algorithm proceeds via bisection
on the optimal value of tM−2. For each candidate value of tM−2, the other values can be found
using a sequence of bisection subroutines. These values approximately obey all the equalities in the
system (4) except the first. The direction of the first equality’s violation reveals how to change the
interval for the next outer bisection iteration.
Theorem 3.2. NestedBisection finds an -optimal t in O (M log2 M ) operations, where -optimal
means that r(t) is within additive constant  of optimal.
The proof is in the appendix. The main difficulty is finding a Lipschitz constant (δ) for how
much the rate changes with a shift δ in a level ti. This requires lower bounding t1 as a function of
M . In practice, the algorithm runs instantaneously on a modern machine (e.g. for M = 200).
3.4 Visualization and discussion
Figure 1 shows how the optimal β varies with weights w and matching rates g. Higher relative
weights in a region lead to a larger range of β(θ) there to make it easier to distinguish those items
(e.g., prioritizing the best items induces a β shifted right). Higher relative matching rates g(θ)
have the opposite effect, as frequent sampling naturally increases accuracy for the best items. We
formalize this shifting in Appendix Section B.3.
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ALGORITHM 1: Nested Bisection
Data: Number of intervals M , match function g
Result: β levels, i.e. {t0 . . . tM−1}
Function main (M , δ, g)
while Uncertainty region for tM−2 is bigger than error tolerance do
Calculate r(tM−2, 1), the rate between current guess for tM−2, and tM−1 = 1.
Fixing tM−2, find t1 . . . tM−3 such that r(t1, t2) = r(t2, t3) = · · · = r(tM−3, tM−2) = r(tM−2, 1),
which can be done through a sequence of bisection routines.
Calculate r(0, t1), the rate between current guess for t1, and t0 = 0.
Compare r(tM−2, 1) and r(0, t1), adjust uncertainty region for tM−2 accordingly.
return {ti}
It is interesting that even the basic case, with w = 1 and g = 1, has a non-trivial β. One would
expect, with weight and matching functions that treat all items the same, that β would be linear,
i.e. β(θ) = θ. Instead, a third factor non-trivially impacts optimal design: binomial variance is
highest near β(θ) = 12 . Items that receive positive ratings at such frequency have high-variance
scores, and thus the optimal β has a smaller mass of items with such scores.
4 Designing approximately optimal, implementable rating systems
We now turn to our second question: How does a platform build and implement a real rating system
such that buyers behave near-optimally, i.e. according to a calculated β?. In this section, we give
an example design procedure for how a platform would do so, and in the next section we validate
our procedure through an experiment on Mechanical Turk.
Recall that β(θ) gives the probability at which an item of quality θ should receive a positive
rating. However, the platform cannot force buyers to rate according to this function. Rather, it
must ask questions of buyers that will induce a proportion β(θ) of them to give positive ratings for
an item θ.
Throughout the section, we assume that an optimal β(θ) has been calculated (for some M , g,
and w).
Resources available to platform. We suppose the platform has a set Y of possible binary
questions that it could ask a buyer, e.g., “Are you satisfied with your experience” or “Is this experience
your best on our platform?”. Informally, at each rating opportunity (i.e., match made), the rater
can be shown a single question y ∈ Y. Let ψ(θ, y) be the probability an item quality θ would receive
a positive rating when the rater is asked question y ∈ Y.
We further suppose the platform has a set Θ of representative items for which it has access to
item quality. Θ, then, is the granularity at which the platform can collect data about historical
performance, or otherwise get expert labels. (We assume M  |Θ|).
Using known set Θ, the platform can run an experiment to create an estimate ψˆ(θ, y),∀y ∈
Y, θ ∈ Θ.
Design heuristic. How can the platform build an effective rating system using these primitives
and β? We consider the following heuristic design: the platform randomly shows a question y ∈ Y
to each buyer. The choice of the platform is a distribution H(y) over y ∈ Y; in other words, for
the platform the design of the system amounts to choosing the frequency with which each question
is shown. At each rating opportunity, y is chosen from Y according to H, independently across
opportunities.
Clearly, the probability that an item θ receives a positive rating is: β˜(θ) ,
∑
y∈Y ψ(θ, y)H(y).
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Figure 2: Experiment and simulation results
We want a distribution H such that β˜(θ) = β(θ) for all θ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., that the positive rating
probability for each item is exactly the optimal value. However, there may not exist any set of
questions Y with associated ψ and choice of H such that β˜ = β.7
We propose the following heuristic to address this difficulty. Choose a probability distribution
H to minimize the following L1 distance:
min
H:‖H‖1=1
∑
θ∈Θ
|β(θ)−
∑
y∈Y
ψˆ(θ, y)H(y)| (5)
This heuristic uses the data available to the platform, ψˆ(θ, y) for a set of items θ ∈ Θ, and designs
H so at least these items receive ratings close to their optimal ratings β(θi). Then, as long as ψ is
well-behaved, and Θ is representative of the full set, one can hope that β˜(θ) u β(θ), for all θ ∈ [0, 1].
Discussion. Real-world analogue & constraints. A special case of this system is already in
place on many platforms, where the same question is always shown. Static systems can be designed
by restricting H to only have mass at one question y. More generally, constraints can be used in
optimization (5).
Limitations. Our model does not allow for y to be chosen adaptively based on the platform’s
current knowledge of the item. In practice, this may be a reasonable restriction for implementation
purposes. Our model also restricts aggregation to be binary; the platform in our model does not
use information on how “hard” a question y is.
5 Mechanical Turk experiment
In the previous sections, we showed how to find an optimal rating function β and we how to
apply such a β to design a binary rating system using empirical data. In this section, we deploy
an experiment on Amazon Mechanical Turk to apply these insights in practice. First, we collect
data that can be used to create a reasonable real-world example of ψ(θ, y), as a proof of concept
with which we can apply our optimization approach. Then, we use this model to demonstrate
some key features of optimal and heuristic designs as computed via our methodology, and show
that they perform well relative to natural benchmarks. Details of experimental design, simulation
methodology, and results are in Appendix A.
Experiment description. We have a set of 10 English paragraphs of various writing quality,
with expert scores θ, from a TOEFL book [11]; there were 5 unique possible experts ratings, i.e.
7There are special cases where an exact solution exists. For example, let Y = [0, 1], and ψ(θ, y) = I[θ ≥ y].
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θ ∈ {.1, .3, .5, .7, .9}. For each possible rating, we have two paragraphs who received that score from
experts.
We asked workers on Mechanical Turk to rate the writing quality of the paragraphs from a set
of adjectives, Y. Using this data, we estimate ψ(θ, y), i.e., the probability of positive rating when
a question based on adjective y ∈ Y is shown for paragraph with quality θ ∈ Θ. (e.g., “Would you
consider this paragraph of quality [adjective] or better?”) Figure 2a shows our estimated ψˆ for our
10 paragraphs.
Optimization. Next, we find the optimal β for various matching and weight functions using the
methods from Section 3. In particular, we have β for all permutations of the cases g = 1, g = 1+10θ11 ,
and w = 1, w = θ1θ2(θ1 − θ2), and w = (1− θ1)(1− θ2)(θ1 − θ2). Recall that this step does not use
experimental data.
Then, using ψˆ and calculated βs, we apply the heuristic from Section 4 to find the distribution
H with which to sample the questions (adjectives) in Y. Figure 2b shows the optimal β (with g = 1,
w = 1), and estimated β˜ from the procedure.
Simulation. Finally, we study the performance of these designs via simulation in various
settings. We simulate a system with 500 items and 100 buyers according to the model in Section
3.1, except that matching is stochastic: at each time, a random 100 items receive ratings, based
on observed scores xk(θ) rather than true quality θ. Furthermore, in some simulations, we have
sellers entering and exiting the market with some probability at each time step. We measure the
performance of all the designs. For comparison, we also simulate a naive H = 1|Y| .
Note that our experiment only provides ψˆ associated with qualities θ ∈ Θ, and for simulations
we construct a full ψ(θ, y), ∀θ ∈ [0, 1] from these points by averaging and interpolating (in order to
model human behavior for the full system). Further, our calibrated simulations only provide rough
evidence for the approach: although we use real-world data, the simulations assume that our model
reflects reality, except for where we deviate as described above.
Results and discussion. Figure 2c shows the simulated performance (as measured by Kendall’s
τ correlation) of the various designs over time, when g = 1. Further plots are in the Appendix
Figure 6, showing performance under various weight functions w and matching functions g, and
with items entering and exiting the market. We find that:
First, the optimal β for each setting outperforms other possible functions, as expected. The
designs are robust to (some) assumptions in the model being broken, especially regarding matching.
Second, the H from our procedure outperforms other designs, but is worse than the optimal
system β. In general, the simulated gap between an implemented system and optimal design β
provides the platform quantitative insight on the system’s sub-optimality.
Third, comparing β˜ to β gives qualitative insight on how to improve the system. For example,
in Figure 2b, β˜ is especially inaccurate for θ ∈ [0, .4]. The platform must thus find better questions
for items of such quality. Figure 2a corroborates: our questions cannot separate two low quality
paragraphs rated differently by experts (in dark blue and green).
A wide range of recent empirical work has documented that real-world rating systems experience
substantial inflation; almost all items receive positive ratings almost every match [13, 14, 30]. Our
formulation helps understand how – and whether – such inflation is suboptimal, and provides
guidance to platform designers. In particular, rating inflation can be interpreted as a current β(θ)
that is very high for almost all item qualities θ. This system is well-performing if the platform
objective is to separate the worst items from the rest, or if high quality items receive many more
ratings than low quality ones; it is clearly sub-optimal in other cases. Our paper provides a template
for how a platform might address such a situation.
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Appendix A Mechanical Turk experiment, simulations, and results
In this section, we expand upon the results discussed in Section 5. We design and run an experiment
that a real platform may run to design a rating system. We follow the general framework in Section 4.
We first run an experiment to estimate a ψ(θ, y), the probability at which each item with quality
θ receives a positive answer under different questions y. Then, we design H(y), using our optimal
β for various settings (different objectives w and matching rates g). Then, we simulate several
markets (using the various matching rates g) and measure the performance of the different rating
system designs H, as measured by various objective functions (2).
A.1 Experiment description
We now describe our Mechanical Turk experiment. We ask subjects to rate the English proficiency
of ten paragraphs. These paragraphs are modified TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language)
essays with known scores as determined by experts [11]. Subjects were given six answer choices,
drawn randomly from the following list: Abysmal, Awful, Bad, Poor, Mediocre, Fair, Good, Great,
Excellent, Phenomenal, following the recommendation of Hicks et al. [18]. Poor and Good are always
chosen, and the other four are sampled uniformly at random for each worker. One paragraph is
shown per page; returning to modify a previous answer is not allowed; and paragraphs are presented
in a random order. This data is used to calibrate a model of ψ for optimization, i.e. to simulate
a system with a set of questions Y, where each question y corresponds to a adjective, “Would you
characterize the performance of this item as [adjective] or better?”.8
Different experiment trials are described below. Pilots were primarily used to garner feedback
regarding the experiment from workers (fair pay, time needed to complete, website/UI comments,
etc). All trials yield qualitatively similar results in terms of both paragraph ratings and feedback
rating distributions for various scales.
Pilot 1 30 workers. Similar conditions as final experiment (6 words sampled for paragraph ratings,
all uniformly at random, 5 point scale feedback rating), with identical question phrasing, “How
does the following rate on English proficiency and argument coherence?”.
Pilot 2 30 workers. 7 words sampled for paragraph ratings, 6 point scale feedback rating, with the
following question phrasing: “How does the following person rate on English proficiency and
argument coherence?”.
Experiment 200 workers. 6 words sampled for paragraph ratings, with 2 fixed as described above,
5 point scale feedback rating. Question phrasing, “How does the following rate on English
proficiency and argument coherence?”.
We use paragraphs modified from a set published by the Educational Testing Service [11]. There
are 10 paragraphs, 5 each on 2 different topics. For each topic, the paragraphs have 5 distinct expert
scores. Paragraphs are shortened to just a few sentences, and the top rated paragraphs are improved
and the worst ones are made worse, preserving the ranking according to the expert scores.
Figure 3a shows time spent on each page of the experiment, Figure 3b shows the time spent per
paragraph, and Figure 3c shows the cumulative density function for time spent by workers. The
paragraphs are presented to workers in a random order. No workers are excluded in our data and
all workers were paid $1.00, including the ones that spent 2-3 seconds per page. 7/60 workers in the
8The data from the experiment is also used for a separate paper, [16]. In that work, we analyze the full multi-
option question directly, but the main focus is reporting the results of a separate, live trial on a large online labor
platform.
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Figure 4: Paragraph rating distribution – for paragraph θ and rating word y, the empirical ψˆ(θ, y)
is shown. Colors encode the true quality as rated by experts (light blue is best quality, dark blue is
worst).
pilots received a bonus of $0.20 for providing feedback. The instructions advised workers to spend
no more than a minute per question, though this was not enforced.
The instructions for the main experiment were as follows: “Please rate on English proficiency
(grammar, spelling, sentence structure) and coherence of the argument, but not on whether you
agree with the substance of the text.” No additional context was provided.
A.2 Calculating optimal β and H
Figure 4 shows the empirical ψˆ(θ, y) as measured through our experiment. The colors encode the
true quality as rated by experts (light blue is best quality, dark blue is worst); recall there are 10
paragraphs with 5 distinct expert ratings (paragraphs 0 and 5 are rated the best, paragraphs 4 and
9 are rated the worst).
With the β calculated and visualized using the methods in Section 3, we now find the optimal H
for various settings using the methods in Section 4. We view our set of paragraphs as representative
items Θ from a larger universe of paragraphs. In particular, we view our worst quality paragraphs
as in the 10th percentile of paragraphs, and our best items as in the 90th percentile. In other
words, from the empirical ψˆ, we carry out the methods in Section 4 using a ψ s.t. ψ(.1, y) =
(ψˆ(4, y) + ψˆ(9, y)/2 (and similarly for ψ(.3, y), ψ(.5, y), ψ(.7, y), ψ(.9, y), where e.g. ψˆ(4, y) is the
empirical rate at which paragraph 4 received a positive rating on question y.
Then, we solve the optimization problem for H stated in Section 4. From the above discussion,
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Figure 5: Optimal H(y) varying by w(θ1, θ2) using Mechanical Turk data
we want to find an H such that the worst rated paragraphs in our experiment have a probability of
receiving a positive rating that is approximately β(.1).
Figure 5 shows the optimal H calculated for various platform settings. These distributions
illustrate how often certain binary questions should be asked as it depends on the matching rates
and platform objective. For example, as Figure 5a shows, when there is uniform matching and
the platform cares about the entire ranking (i.e. has Kendall’s τ or Spearman’s ρ objective), it
should ask most buyers to answer the question, “Would you rate this item as having ‘Fair’ quality
or better?”.
Several qualitative insights can be drawn from the optimal H. Most importantly, note that the
optimal designs vary significantly with the platform objective and matching rates. In other words,
given the same empirical data ψˆ, the platform’s design changes substantially based on its goals and
how skewed matches are on the platform. Further, note that the differences in H follow from the
differences in β that are illustrated in Figure 1: when the platform wants to accurately rank the best
items, the questions that distinguish amongst the best (e.g., “Would you rate this item as having
‘Good’ quality?”) are drawn more often.
A.3 Simulation description
Using the above data and subsequent designs, we simulate markets with a binary rating system as
described in Section 3.1. Our simulations have the following characteristics.
• 500 items. Items have i.i.d. quality in [0, 1]. For item with quality θ, we model buyer rating
data using the ψ collected from the experiment as follows. In particular, we presume the items
are convex combinations of the representative items in our experiment – items with quality
θ ∈ [.1, .3] are assumed to have rating probabilities ψ(θ, y) = αψ(.1, y)+(1−α)ψ(.3, y), where
α = (θ−.1)/.2. Similarly for θ in other intervals. This process yields the β˜ shown in Figure 2b.
• In some simulations, all items enter the market at time k = 0 and do not leave. In the others,
with entry and exit, each item independently leaves the market with probability .02 at the
end of each time period, and a new item with quality drawn i.i.d. from [0, 1] enters.
• There are 100 buyers, each of which matches to an item independently. In other words,
matching is independent across items, and items can match more than once per time period.
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• Matching is random with probability as a function of an item’s estimated rank θˆ according to
score, rather than actual rank. In other words, the optimal systems were designed assuming
item θ would match at rate g(θ); instead it matches according to g(θˆ), where θˆ is the item’s
rank according to score. We use both g = 1 and linear search, g(θˆ) = 1+10θˆ11 .
• Y is the set of 9 adjectives from our MTurk experiments.
• We test several possible H: naive with H(y) = 1|Y| , and then the various optimal H calculated
for the different sections, illustrated in Figure 5.
A.3.1 Simulation results
Figure 6 contains plots from a simulated system that has binary ratings. Figures 6a, 6b are with
uniform search (g = 1), Figures 6c and 6d plot the objective prioritizing the worst items, and
Figures 6e and 6f are with linearly increasing search. For each setting, we include both plots with
and without birth/death.
Together, the results suggest that the asymptotic and rate-wise optimality of our calculated
β hold even under deviations of the model, and that the real-world design approach outlined in
Section 4 would provide substantial information benefits to platforms.
Several specific qualitative insights can be drawn from the figures, alongside those discussed in
the main text.
1. From all the plots with uniform search, the H designed using our methods for the given setting
outperforms other H designs, as expected, and the optimal β (for the given setting) significantly
outperforms other designs both asymptotically and rate-wise.
2. Qualitatively, again with uniform search, heterogeneous item age also does not affect the results.
In fact, it seems as if the optimal β and best possible H (given the data) as calculated from
our methods outperforms other designs both asymptotically and rate-wise. Note that this is true
even though items entering and leaving the market means that the system may not enter the
asymptotics under which our theoretical results hold.
3. Figures 6c and 6d show the same system parameters as Figures 6a, 6b, i.e. uniform search.
However, while 6a, 6b show Kendall’s τ correlation over time, 6c and 6d show the objective
prioritizing bottom items (w = (1 − θ1)(1 − θ2)(θ1 − θ2)). Note that the β calculated for the
actual objective outperforms that calculated for Kendall’s τ , including asymptotically.
Similarly, complementing the fact that H design changes significantly with the weight function,
these plots show the value of designing while taking into account one’s true objective value – the
different designs perform differently. Mis-specifying one’s objective (e.g. designing to differentiate
the best items when one truly cares about the worst items) leads to a large gap in performance
(e.g. see the gap between the dark green and red lines in 6c and 6d).
Note that comparing the performance of β for the misspecified objective and H for the true
objective is not a fair comparison: the former differentiates between all items (though potentially
not in a rate-optimal way), while H is constrained by reality, i.e. ψ and Y.
4. Now, consider Figures 6e and 6f, which plot the system with linearly increasing search. Note
that, contrary to expectation, the optimal β for uniform search outperforms the β for the actual
system simulated, with linear search! This pattern is especially true for small time k and with
item birth/death.
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This inversion can be explained as follows. Uniformization occurs with heterogeneous age and
matching according to observed quality: new items of high type are likely to be mis-ranked lower,
while new items of low type are more likely to be mis-ranked higher. (We note that this may not
matter in practice, where the search function itself is fit through data, which already captures
this effect.) These errors are prominent at low time k and with item birth/death, i.e., in the
latter our system never reaches the asymptotics at which the linear β is the optimal design.
This pattern can be seen more clearly by comparing the two β curves in Figures 6e, without
item birth/death. At small k, when errors are common and so search is more effectively uniform,
the β for uniform matching performs the best. However, as such errors subside over time, the
performance of the β for linear search catches up and eventually surpasses that of uniform optimal
β.
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Figure 6: Simulations from data from Mechanical Turk experiment – Binary rating system
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Appendix B Supplementary theoretical information and results
We now give some additional detail and develop additional results. Section B.1 contains the formal
specification and update of our deterministic dynamical system. Section B.2 gives our algorithm,
Nested Bisection, is far more detailed pseudo-code. Section B.3 formalizes our earlier qualitative
discussion on how matching rates affects the function β. Section B.4 includes a convergence result
for functions βM as M increases. Finally, Section B.5 contains simple results on how one can learn
ψ(θ, y) through experiments, even if one does not have a reference set of items Θ with known quality
before one begins experiments.
B.1 Formal specification of system state update
Recall that µk(Θ, X) is the mass of items with true quality θ ∈ Θ ⊆ [0, 1] and a reputation score
x ∈ X ⊆ [0, 1] at time k. Let Ek = {θ : nk(θ) = nk−1(θ) + 1}. These are the items who receive an
additional rating at time k; for all θ ∈ Eck, nk(θ) = nk−1(θ). Our system is completely deterministic,
and evolves according to the distributions of the individual seller dynamics.
For each θ ∈ Ek, x, x′, define ω(θ, x, x′) as follows:
ω(θ, x, x′) = β(θ)I{nk(θ)x− nk−1(θ)x′ = 1}+ (1− β(θ))I{nk(θ)x− nk−1(θ)x′ = 0}.
Then ω gives the probability of transition from x′ to x when an item receives a rating. We then
have:
µk+1(Θ, X) =
∫
Ek
∫ 1
x′=0
∫
x∈X
ω(θ, x, x′)dxµk(dx′, dθ) +
∫
Eck
∫
x∈X
µk(dx, dθ).
It is straightforward but tedious to check that the preceding dynamics are well defined, given our
primitives.
B.2 Detailed algorithm
Here, we present the Nested Bisection algorithm, which is described at a high level and summarized
in pseudo-code in the main text, in more detail.
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ALGORITHM 2: Nested Bisection given in more detail
Data: Set size M , grid width δ, match function g /* Assume δ << mini ti − ti−1 */
Result: βM levels {t0 . . . tM−1}
Function main (M , δ, g)
t0 = 0, tM−1 = 1
` = 1− 1M−1 , u = 1− δ
while u− ` > δ/2 do
jM−2 = r+`2
ratelast = −gM−2 log(tM−2)
{j1 . . . jM−3} = CalculateOtherLevels(jM−2, ratelast, g)
ratefirst = −g1 log(1− t1)
if ratefirst < ratelast then ` = jM−2
else u = jM−2
{t1 . . . tM−2} = CalculateOtherLevels(u, g)
tM−2 = u
return {ti}
Function PairwiseRate (tm−1, tm, gm, gm−1)
return −(gm−1 + gm) log
[
(1− tm−1)
gm−1
gm−1+gm (1− tm)
gm
gm−1+gm + t
gm−1
gm−1+gm
m−1 t
gm
gm−1+gm
m
]
Function CalculateOtherLevels (jM−2, ratetarget, g)
/* Given target rate from current guess jM−2, sequentially fix other levels. */
foreach m ∈M − 3 . . . 1 do
jm = BisectNextLevel(jm+1, ratetarget, gm, gm+1)
return {j1 . . . jM−3}
Function BisectNextLevel (jm, ratetarget, gm−1, gm)
` = 0, r = jm − δ
while r − ` > δ/2 do
jm−1 = r+`2
ratem = PairwiseRate(jm−1, jm, gm−1, gm)
if ratem ≤ ratetarget then r = jm−1
else ` = jm−1
return r
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B.3 Formalization of effect of matching rates shifting
Matching concentrating at the top items moves mass of β(θ) away from high θ, and subsequently
mass of H(y) away from the questions that help distinguish the top items, as observed in Fig-
ures 1b and 5b above. Informally, this occurs because when matching concentrates, top items are
accumulating many ratings more ratings comparatively, and so the amount of information needed
per rating is comparatively less. We formalize this intuition in Lemma B.1 below.
The lemma states that if matching rates shift such that there is an index k above which matching
rates increase and below which they decrease, then correspondingly the levels of β, (i.e. ti) become
closer together above k.
Lemma B.1. Suppose k, g, g˜ such that ∀j ∈ {k+1 . . .M−1}, gj ≥ g˜j, and ∀j ∈ {0 . . . k−1}, gj ≤ g˜j,
and gk = g˜k. Then, t∗k ≥ t˜∗k.
Proof. This proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1, except that with the matching function changing
the overall rate function can either increase, decrease, or stay the same. Suppose the overall rate
function decreased or stayed the same when the matching function changed from g˜ to g. Then
gM−2 > g˜M−2 and the target rate is no larger, and so t∗M−2 > t˜
∗
M−2. Then, t
∗
M−3 > t˜
∗
M−3 (a smaller
width is needed because the matching rates are higher and the rate is no larger, and the next value
also increased). This shifting continues until t∗k+1 > t˜
∗
k+1. Then, t
∗
k > t˜
∗
k.
Suppose instead that the overall rate function increased when the matching function changed
from g˜ to g. Then g1 < g˜1 and the target rate is larger, and so t∗1 > t˜∗1. Then, t∗2 > t˜∗2 (a larger
width is needed and the previous value also increased). This shifting continues until t∗k−1 > t˜
∗
k−1.
Then, t∗k > t˜
∗
k.
B.4 Limit of β as M →∞
Let βwM denote the optimal β with M intervals for weight function w, with intervals {SwMi } =
{[swMi , swMi+1 )} and levels twM . Let qwM (θ) = i/M when θ ∈ [swMi , swMi+1 ), i.e. the quantile of
interval item of type θ is in.
Then, we have the following convergence result for βM .
Theorem B.1. Let g be uniform. Suppose w such that qwM converges uniformly. Then, ∀C ∈
N,∃βw s.t. βw
C2N+1
→ βw uniformly as N →∞.
The proof is technical and is below. We leverage the fact that, for g uniform, the levels of β2M
can be analytically written as a function of the levels of βM . We believe (numerically observe)
that this theorem holds for the entire sequence as opposed to the each such subsequence, and for
general matching functions g. However, our proof technique does not carry over, and the proof
would leverage more global properties of the optimal βM .
Furthermore, the condition on w is light. For example, it holds for Kendall’s τ , Spearman’s ρ,
and all other examples mentioned in this work.
This convergence result suggests that the choice of M when calculating a asymptotic and rate
optimal β is not consequential. As M increases, the limiting value of Wk increases to 1 (i.e. the
asymptotic value increases), but the optimal rate decreases to 0. As discussed above, with strictly
increasing and continuous β, the asymptotic value is 1 but the large deviations rate does not exist,
i.e. convergence is polynomial.
This result could potentially be strengthened as follows: first, show convergence on the entire
sequence as opposed to these exponential subsequences, as conjectured; second, show desirable
properties of the limiting function itself. It is conceivable but not necessarily true that the limiting
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function is “better” than other strictly continuous increasing functions in some rate sense, even
though the comparison through large deviations rate is degenerate.
B.5 Learning ψ(θ, y) through experiments
Now, we show how a platform would run an experiment to decide to learn ψ(θ, y). In particular,
one potential issue is that the platform does not have any items with know quality that it can use
as representative items in its optimization. In this case, we show that it can use ratings within the
experiment itself to identify these representative items. The results essentially follow from the law
of large numbers.
We assume that |Θ| = L representative items i ∈ {1 . . . L} are in the experiment, and each are
matched N times. The experiment proceeds as follows: every time an item is matched, show the
buyer a random question from Y. For each word y ∈ Y, track the empirical ψˆ(i, y), the proportion
of times a positive response was given to question y. Alternatively, if Y is totally ordered (i.e. a
positive rating for a given y also implies positive ratings would be given to all “easier” y′), and
can be phrased as a multiple choice question, data collection can be faster: e.g., as we do in our
experiments: Y consists of a set of totally ordered adjectives that can describe the item; the rater is
asked to pick an adjective out of the set; this is interpreted as the item receiving a positive answer
to the questions induced by the chosen answer and all worse adjectives, and a negative answer to
all better adjectives.
First, suppose the platform approximately knows the quality θi of each item i, and θi are evenly
distributed in [0, 1]. Suppose the items are ordered by index, i.e. θ1 < θ2 < · · · < θL. Then let
ψˆ(θ, y) = ψˆ(i, y) when θ ∈ [θi−1, θi]. Call this procedure KnownTypeExperiment.
Lemma B.2. Suppose ψ(θ, y) is Lipschitz continuous in θ. With KnownTypeExperiment, ψˆ(i, y)→
ψ(θi, y)∀y uniformly as N →∞. As L→∞, ψˆ(θ, y)→ ψ(θ, y)∀θ uniformly.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the Strong Law of Large Numbers. As N →∞, ∀i, ψˆ(i, x)→
ψ(θi, x) uniformly. Now, let L→∞. ∀, ∃L′ s.t. ∀L > L′, ∀θ,∃i s.t. |θ−θi| < . ψ(θ, x) is Lipschitz
in θ by assumption, and so ψˆ(θ, x)→ ψ(θ, x) uniformly.
We now relax the assumption that the platform has an existing set of items with known qualities.
Suppose instead the platform has many items L of unknown quality who are expected to match N
times each over the experiment time period. For each item, the platform would again ask questions
from Y, drawn according to any distribution (with positive mass on each question). Then generate
ψˆ(θ, y) as follows: first, rank the items according to their ratings during the experiment itself.
Then, for each y, ψˆ(θ, y) is the empirical performance of the θth percentile item in the ranking, i.e.
ψˆ(θ, y) = ψˆ(θi, y) for θ ∈
[
i−1
L ,
i
L
]
. Call this procedure UnknownTypeExperiment.
Lemma B.3. Suppose ψ(θ, y) is Lipschitz continuous in θ. With UnknownTypeExperiment, ψˆ(θ, y)→
ψ(θ, y)∀y, θ uniformly as L,N →∞.
Proof. Fix L. Denote each item in the experiment as i ∈ {1 . . . L} (with true quality θi 6= θj),
and each item has N samples. Without loss of generality, assume the items are indexed according
to their rank on the average of their scores on the samples, defined as the percentage of positive
ratings received. i = 1 is then the worst item, and i = L is the best item according to scores in the
experiment.
For ψ(θ, x) increasing in θ, as N → ∞, Pr(θi > θj |i < j) → 0 almost surely by SLLN, and for
a fixed L, {θi} this convergence is uniform. Furthermore, by SLLN, ψˆ(i, x)→ ψ(θi, x) as N →∞.
Recall ψˆ(θ, x) = ψˆ(i, x) for θ ∈ [ i−1L , iL].
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Now, let L → ∞. ∀,∃L′ s.t. ∀L > L′, ∀θ,∃i s.t. |θ − θi| < . ψ(θ, x) is Lipschitz in θ by
assumption, and so ψˆ(θ, x)→ ψ(θ, x) uniformly.
Appendix C Proofs
In this Appendix section, we prove our results.
Sections C.1-C.3 develop rate functions for Pk and Wk. While rates for Pk follow immediately
from large deviation results, the rate function for Wk requires more effort as the quantity is an
integral over a continuum of (θ1, θ2), each of which has a rate corresponding to that of Pk(θ1, θ2).
Then in Section C.4 we prove Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 3.1.
Section C.5 then contains additional necessary lemmas required for the proof of the algorithm
and convergence result, Theorem B.1. The main difficulty for the former is showing a Lipschitz
constant in the resulting rate if a level ti is shifted, which requires lower and upper bounds for
t1 and tM−2, respectively. For the former, we need to relate the solutions of the sequence of
optimization problems used to find βM as M increases. It turns out that both properties follow by
relating the levels of βM to those of β2M−1.
These additional lemmas are used to prove the algorithm approximation bound (Theorem 3.2)
and the convergence result (Theorem B.1) in Section C.6 and C.7, respectively.
Finally in Section C.8 we prove the comments we make in the main text about Kendall’s τ and
Spearman’s ρ rank correlations belonging in our class of objective functions, with asymptotic values
of Wk maximized when s is equispaced in [0, 1].
C.1 Rate functions for Pk(θ1, θ2)
Lemma C.1.
lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [µ((xk(θ1)− xk(θ2)) ≤ 0|θ1, θ2)] = inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)}
where I(a|`) = supz{za − Λ(z|θ)}, and Λ(z|θ) is the log moment generating function of a single
sample from x(θ1) and g(θ) is the sampling rate.
Proof. limk→∞− 1k log [µ((xk(θ1)− xk(θ2)) ≤ 0|θ1, θ2)]
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log
[∫
a∈R
µ((xk(θ1) = a|θ1)µ(xk(θ2) ≥ a|θ2)da
]
(6)
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log
[∫
a∈R
e−kg(θ1)I(a|θ1)e−kg(θ2)I(a|θ2)da
]
(7)
= inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)} Laplace principle (8)
Where (7) is a basic result from large deviations, where kg(θi) is the number of samples item of
quality θi has received.
Note that this lemma also appears in Glynn and Juneja [17], which uses the Gartner-Ellis
Theorem in the proof. Our proof is conceptually similar but instead uses Laplace’s principle.
Recall that KL(a||b) = a log ba + (1−a) log 1−b1−a is the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between
Bernoulli random variables with success probabilities a and b respectively. It is well known that for
a Bernoulli random variable with success probability t,
I(a|t) = KL(a||t)
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Then, we have
Lemma C.2. Let θ1 > θ2 and I(a|θ) = KL(a||β(θ)). Further, Let P k(θ1, θ2) = 1 − Pk(θ1, θ2).
Then,
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θ1, θ2) = inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)} , (9)
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma C.1.
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θ1, θ2|β)
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [1 + µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) < 0|θ1, θ2)− µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) > 0|θ1, θ2)]
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [2µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) < 0|θ1, θ2) + µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) = 0|θ1, θ2)]
= lim
k→∞
−1
k
log [µk(xk(θ1)− xk(θ2) ≤ 0|θ1, θ2)]
= inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|θ1) + g(θ2)I(a|θ2)} Lemma C.1
C.2 Laplace’s principle with sequence of rate functions
In order to derive a rate function for W k = (limkWk)−Wk, we need to be able to relate its rate to
that of P k(θ1, θ2). The following theorem, related to Laplace’s principle for large deviations allows
us to do so.
Theorem C.1. Suppose that X is compact with finite Lebesgue measure µ(X) <∞. Suppose that
ϕ(x) has an essential infimum ϕ on X, that ϕn(x) has an essential infimum ϕn, that both ϕ and
all ϕn are nonnegative, and that ϕn → ϕ uniformly:
lim
n→∞ supx∈X
|ϕn(x)− ϕ(x)| = 0.
Then:
lim
n→∞
1
n
log
∫
X
e−nϕn(x)dx = −ϕ. (10)
Proof. First, we note that for all x and n, e−nϕn(x) ≤ e−nϕn . Therefore, letting (∗) denote the
LHS of (10), we have:
(∗) ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
log
∫
X
e−nϕndx = −ϕ,
where the last limit follows from the fact that ϕn converges uniformly to ϕ, so that ϕn → ϕ.
Next, for  > 0 let An() = {x : ϕn(x) ≤ ϕn + } and let A() = {x : ϕ(x) ≤ ϕ + }. It
follows (again by uniform convergence) that for all sufficiently large n, A(/2) ⊆ An(), so that
µ(A(/2)) ≤ µ(An()) for all sufficiently large n. Further, µ(A(/2)) > 0, since ϕ is the essential
infimum.
Since: ∫
X
e−nϕn(x)dx ≥ µ(An())e−n(ϕn+),
25
it follows that:
(∗) ≥ −ϕ− + lim
n→∞
1
n
logµ(An()).
To complete the proof, observe that since µ(An()) is bounded below by a positive constant for all
sufficiently large n, the last limit is zero. Therefore:
(∗) ≥ −ϕ− .
Since  was arbitrary, this completes the proof.
Remark C.1. Let X = [0, 1] × [0, 1], ϕn(θ1, θ2) = − 1n logPn(θ1, θ2). Then, all the conditions for
Theorem C.1 are met.
C.3 Rate function for Wk
Our next lemma shows that we can obtain a nontrivial large deviations rate for Wk when β is a
step-wise increasing function.
Recall Wk =
∫
θ1>θ2
w(θ1, θ2)Pk(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2).
Let P k(θ1, θ2) = 1− Pk(θ1, θ2).
Further, let W k = (limkWk)−Wk =
∫
θ1>θ2
w(θ1, θ2)P k(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2). (recall we assumed w
integrates to 1 without loss of generality).
Lemma C.3. Suppose β is piecewise constant with M levels {ti}. Let gi , infθ∈Si g(θ) = g(si)
Then,
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logW k = min
0≤i≤M−2
inf
a∈R
{gi+1I(a|ti+1) + giI(a|ti)} , r, (11)
where I(a|t) = KL(a||t) as defined in Lemma C.2.
Proof. When β is step-wise increasing with M levels {ti}, then
W k =
∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)P k(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2)
as P k(θ1, θ2) = 0 when β(θ1) = β(θ2).
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− limk→∞ 1k logW k
= − lim
k→∞
1
k
log
∫
θ1>θ2
w(θ1, θ2)P k(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2) (12)
= − lim
k→∞
1
k
log
∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)P k(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2) (13)
= − max
0≤i<j<M
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
[
log
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)P k(θj , θi|β)d(θ1, θ2)
])
(14)
= − max
0≤i<j<M
sup
θ1∈Sj ,θ2∈Si
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
[
logw(θ1, θ2)P k(θj , θi|β)
])
(15)
= − max
0≤i<j<M
sup
θ1∈Sj ,θ2∈Si
(
lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θj , θi|β)
)
(16)
= min
0≤i<j<M
inf
θ1∈Sj ,θ2∈Si
(
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θj , θi|β)
)
(17)
= min
0≤i<j<M
inf
θ1∈Sj ,θ2∈Si
inf
a∈R
{g(θ1)I(a|tj) + g(θ2)I(a|ti)} (18)
= min
0≤i<j<M
inf
a∈R
{gjI(a|tj) + giI(a|ti)} (19)
= min
0≤i<M−1
inf
a∈R
{gi+1I(a|ti+1) + giI(a|ti)} (20)
The last line follows from adjacent ti, ti+1 dominating the rate due to monotonicity properties.
Line (15) follows from Theorem C.1.
Line (14) follows from: ∀ai ≥ 0, lim sup→0
[
 log
(∑N
i a

i
)]
= maxNi lim sup→0 log(a

i), which
is a finite case version (with fewer assumptions) of Theorem C.1. See, e.g., Lemma 1.2.15 in [10] for
a proof of this property.
Lemma C.4. β(θ) is piecewise constant ⇐⇒ ∃c(β) > 0 s.t. − limk→∞ 1k log(W k) = c(β).
Proof. =⇒ follows directly from Lemma C.3: infa∈R {gi+1I(a|ti+1) + giI(a|ti)} > 0 when ti 6= ti+1,
which holds when β is piece-wise constant with the appropriate number of levels.
⇐= Consider β that is not piece-wise constant. Recall that we further assume that β is non-
decreasing, and discontinuous only on a measure 0 set. Following algebra steps similar to those in
Lemma C.3, but for general β:
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logW k = − lim
k→∞
1
k
log
∫
θ1>θ2
w(θ1, θ2)P k(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2) (21)
= inf
θ1>θ2
(
− lim
k→∞
1
k
logP k(θj , θi|β)
)
(22)
= 0 (23)
Where the last line follows from β continuous at some θ1, and so limθ2→θ1 P k(θ1, θ2|β) = 1.
Intuitively, what goes wrong with continuous β is that P k(θ1, θ2|β) does not converge uniformly:
∀, k, ∃θ2 6= θ1 P k(θ1, θ2) > 
27
i.e. close by items are very hard to distinguish from one another. Then, because the large deviations
rate of W k is dominated by the worst rates under the integral, we don’t get a positive rate.
C.4 Proofs of Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.1
Remark C.2. The KL divergence for two Bernoulli random variables is continuous and strictly
convex, with minima at a = b, when a, b ∈ (0, 1). Note that infa{giKL(a||ti) + g(i+ 1)KL(a||ti+1)},
for all feasible g, is also continuous and strictly convex in ti, ti+1, with minima at ti = ti+1.
One consequence of the above fact is that fixing either ti or ti+1 and moving the other farther
away monotonically increases KL, while moving it closer decreases KL.
C.4.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof. We use the same notation as the proof for Lemma C.3.
Part 1.
lim
k→∞
Wk = lim
k→∞
∑
0≤i<j<M
[∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)Pk(θ1, θ2|β)d(θ1, θ2)
]
(24)
=
∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)d(θ1, θ2) (25)
(25) follows from bounded convergence and Pk(θ1, θ2|β) → 1 for θ1 ∈ Sj , t2 /∈ Sj . Thus choosing s
to maximize (25) maximizes the asymptotic value of Wk.
Part 2. Follows directly from Lemma C.3.
C.4.2 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. Recall r(t) , − limk→∞ 1k log(W−Wk) = min0≤i≤M−2 infa∈R {gi+1KL(a||ti+1) + giKL(a||ti)}.
We show the following:
r(t) =
min
(
log(1− t1)−g1 ,
log
[
(1− ti−1)
gi−1
gi−1+gi (1− ti)
gi
gi−1+gi + t
gi−1
gi−1+gi
i−1 t
gi
gi−1+gi
i
]−gi−1−gi
for 1 < i < M − 1,
log(tM−2)−gM−2
)
and t∗ maximizes rw(t) ⇐⇒ all the terms inside the minimization rw(t∗) are equal. Further, the
optimal levels t∗ are unique. The result immediately follows, that {ti} is the unique solution that
equalizes the rates inside the minimization, by noting that the optimal r has t0 = 0, tM−1 = 1.
We first prove the alternative form for r. Note that {gi−1KL(a||ti−1) + giKL(a||ti)} is convex in
a, and so we can find an analytic form for the infinum over a.
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Let ai = arg infa∈[ti−1,ti]{gi−1KL(a||ti−1) + giKL(a||ti)}
=⇒ ∇ai [gi−1KL(ai||ti−1) + giKL(ai||ti)] = 0
=⇒ ∇ai
[
gi−1
(
ai log
ai
ti−1
+ (1− ai) log 1− ai
1− ti−1
)
+ gi
(
ai log
ai
ti
+ (1− ai) log 1− ai
1− ti
)]
= 0
=⇒ gi−1
(
log
ai
ti−1
− log 1− ai
1− ti−1
)
+ gi
(
log
ai
ti
− log 1− ai
1− ti
)
= 0
=⇒ log
(
ai
1− ai
)gi−1+gi
= log
(
ti−1
1− ti−1
)gi−1
+ log
(
ti
1− ti
)gi
=⇒ ai
1− ai =
[(
ti−1
1− ti−1
)gi−1 ( ti
1− ti
)gi] 1gi−1+gi
=⇒ ai = c
1 + c
, where c =
[(
ti−1
1− ti−1
)gi−1 ( ti
1− ti
)gi] 1gi−1+gi
Then,
gi−1KL(ai||ti−1) + giKL(ai||ti)
= gi−1a log
a
ti−1
+ gia log
a
ti
+ gi−1(1− a) log 1− a
1− ti−1 + gi(1− a) log
1− a
1− ti
= a
[
(gi−1 + gi) log
a
1− a + gi−1 log
1− ti−1
ti−1
+ gi log
1− ti
ti
]
+ log(1− a)gi−1+gi − log(1− ti−1)gi−1(1− ti)gi
= (gi−1 + gi) log(1− a)− log(1− ti−1)gi−1(1− ti)gi (26)
= −(gi−1 + gi) log
[[
1 +
[(
ti−1
1− ti−1
)gi−1 ( ti
1− ti
)gi] 1gi−1+gi ]
(1− ti−1)
gi−1
gi−1+gi (1− ti)
gi
gi−1+gi
]
= −(gi−1 + gi) log
[
(1− ti−1)
gi−1
gi−1+gi (1− ti)
gi
gi−1+gi + t
gi−1
gi−1+gi
i−1 t
gi
gi−1+gi
i
]
(27)
Where line (26) uses a1−a = c and (gi−1 + gi) log c = log
[(
ti−1
1−ti−1
)gi−1 ( ti
1−ti
)gi]
. Note that the
first and last rates emerge, respectively, by plugging in t0 = 0, tM = 1, which holds trivially at the
optimum from monotonicity.
We note that a similar derivation, of the large deviation rate for two binomial distributions with
different probability of successes and match rates, appears in Glynn and Juneja [17]. In that work,
the authors seek to optimize the g in order to identify the single best item out of a set of possible
items, and a concave program emerges. In this work, because we optimize the probability of suc-
cesses and care about retrieving a ranking of the items, no such concave or convex program emerges.
Now we show that t∗ maximizes rw(t) ⇐⇒ all the terms inside the minimization rw(t) are
equal.
equalizes =⇒ optimal. Let r(i) be the ith term in the minimization, starting at i = 1. Note
that (holding the other fixed) increasing ti increases the ith term monotonically and decreases the
(i + 1)th term monotonically. Suppose β s.t. r(i) = r(j)∀i, j. To increase the minimization term,
one must increase r(i) ,∀i. To increase r(1), t1 must increase, regardless of what the other levels are.
Then, to increase r(2), t2 must increase . . . to increase r(M − 2), tM−2 must increase. However, to
increase r(M − 1), tM−2 must decrease, and we have a contradiction. Thus, one cannot increase all
terms simultaneously.
29
equalizes ⇐= optimal. Suppose t maximizes r(t) but the terms inside the minimization are
not equal. Then ∃i s.t. r(i) = minj r(j) and either r(i) 6= r(i − 1) or r(i) 6= r(i + 1). r(i) can be
increased without lowering the overall rate. This method can be repeated ∀i : r(i) = minj r(j) and
so t would not be optimal, a contradiction.
Uniqueness follows from the overall rate unique determining t1, tM−2 and so iteratively uniquely
determining the rest.
C.5 Additional necessary lemmas
Now, we begin the set-up that will lead to a proof for Theorem 3.2. It turns out that proving the
theorem requires, in the process, essentially proving our convergence result with M → ∞, Theo-
rem B.1. For Theorem 3.2, we need a lower bound for t1 as a function of M . This seems hard to do
in general. Luckily, in our case, there is a property for how t∗ changes when M is doubled. Using
this property, we can derive that t∗1 ≥ O(M−3).
Recall that step-wise increasing β with M intervals Si = [si, si+1) has levels {ti}M−1i=0 , where
t0 = 1, tM−1 = 1, and s0 , 0, sM , 1.
Furthermore, we use the following notation for the large deviation rate
ri = −(gi−1 + gi) log
[
(1− ti−1)
gi−1
gi−1+gi (1− ti)
gi
gi−1+gi + t
gi−1
gi−1+gi
i−1 t
gi
gi−1+gi
i
]
(28)
for i ∈ {1 . . .M − 1}, which implies r1 = −g1 log(1− t1) and rM−1 = −gM−2 log(tM−2).
We further use rM−1 to be the rate achieved by the optimal βM with M intervals.
Lemma C.5. Suppose g uniform, i.e. gi = 1,∀i and that βM has values {ti}M−1i=0 . Then β2M−1
has values {t′i}2M−2i=0 , where t′2i = ti, ∀i ∈ {0 . . .M − 1}, t′1 = 12
(
1−√1− t1
)
and t′2M−3 =
1
2 (1 +
√
tM−2).
Proof. We first set the values t′2i = ti and then optimally choose the remaining values t
′
k, k odd.
Then, we show that the resulting large deviation rates between all adjacent pairs are equal. Then,
by the proof of Lemma 3.1, which showed that equalizing the rates between adjacent intervals is a
sufficient condition for optimality, β2M−1 has the levels {t′i}2M−2i=0 .
Let r′ denote rates between adjacent t′ as r does for t. Supposing t′2 = t1, we find t′1 such that
r′1 = r′2 and t′1 < t′2.
− log(1− t′1) = −2 log
[√
(1− t′1)(1− t′2) +
√
t′1t′2
]
=⇒ 1− t′1 = (1− t′1)(1− t′2) + t′1t′2 + 2
√
(1− t′1)(1− t′2)t′1t′2
=⇒ t′1 =
1
2
(
1−
√
1− t′2
)
=
1
2
(
1−√1− t1
)
Similarly, r′2M−3 = r
′
2M−2 when t
′
2M−3 =
1
2 (1 +
√
tM−2). It follows that r′1 = r′2 = r′2M−3 = r
′
2M−2
by choosing such t′1, t′2M−3.
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Next, we find t′k ∈ (t′k−1, t′k+1) for k ∈ {3, 5, . . . 2M − 5} such that the rates r′k = r′k+1.
−2 log
[√
(1− t′k)(1− t′k−1) +
√
t′kt
′
k−1
]
= −2 log
[√
(1− t′k)(1− t′k+1) +
√
t′kt
′
k+1
]
=⇒ t′k =
c
1 + c
, where c =

√
1− t′k+1 −
√
1− t′k−1√
t′k−1 −
√
t′k+1
2
Now, we show that r′k = r
′
j , ∀j, k by showing that the difference between each rate ri and its
analogous rate r′2i is constant. rk = rj , ∀j, k by assumption and so r′k = r′j ,∀j, k follows.
rM−1 = − log tM−2 and r′2M−2 = − log 12 (1 +
√
tM−2). Thus if ri = − log x for some x, then
r2i = − log 12 (1 +
√
x) would imply that all the rates are equal. Thus, it is sufficient to show that[√
(1− t′2i−1)(1− t′2i) +
√
t′2i−1t
′
2i
]2
=
1
2
[
1 +
√
(1− ti−1)(1− ti) +
√
ti−1ti
]
(29)
≡
[√(
1− c
1 + c
)
(1− ti) +
√
c
1 + c
ti
]2
=
1
2
[
1 +
√
(1− ti−1)(1− ti) +
√
ti−1ti
]
(30)
where c =
[√
1− ti −√1− ti−1√
ti−1 −
√
ti
]2
The proof for (30) is algebraically tedious and is shown in Remark C.3 below.
Then, by the proof of Lemma 3.1, which shows that equalizing the rates inside the minimization
terms implies an optimal {ti}, β2M−1 has the levels {t′i}2M−2i=0 .
Remark C.3.[√(
1− c
1 + c
)
(1− ti) +
√
c
1 + c
ti
]2
=
1
2
[
1 +
√
(1− ti−1)(1− ti) +
√
ti−1ti
]
where c =
[√
1− ti −√1− ti−1√
ti−1 −
√
ti
]2
Proof. Let x =
√
ti, y =
√
1− ti, z = √ti−1, and w = √1− ti−1. Note that x > z,w > y, y =
1− x2, w = 1− z2. Then,
c
c+ 1
=
(y − w)2
2− 2xz − 2yw , and
1
c+ 1
=
(x− z)2
2− 2xz − 2yw
(To show the above two equalities, factor out 1
(x−z)2 from numerator and denominator, and substi-
tute y = 1− x2, w = 1− z2).
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Now, the left hand side:[√(
1− c
1 + c
)
(1− ti) +
√
c
1 + c
ti
]2
=
1
2− 2xz − 2yw
[√
(x− z)2y2 +
√
(y − w)2x2
]2
=
(x− z)2y2 + (y − w)2x2 + 2xy(x− z)(w − y)
2− 2xz − 2yw
√
(y − w)2 = w − y,
√
(x− z)2 = x− z
=
z2y2 + w2x2 − 2wxyz
2− 2xz − 2yw
The right hand side:
1
2
[
1 +
√
(1− ti−1)(1− ti) +
√
ti−1ti
]
=
1
2
[1 + (wy + xz)]
Multiplying both sides by 2− 2xz − 2yw, we have:[√(
1− c
1 + c
)
(1− ti) +
√
c
1 + c
ti
]2
=
1
2
[
1 +
√
(1− ti−1)(1− ti) +
√
ti−1ti
]
≡ z2y2 + w2x2 − 2wxyz = 1− (wy + xz)2
≡ z2(1− x2) + (1− z2)x2 − 2wxyz = 1− w2y2 − x2z2 − 2wxyz
≡ z2 − 2x2z2 + x2 = 1− (1− z2)(1− x2)− x2z2
≡ 0 = 0
Corollary C.1. Suppose g uniform, i.e. gi = 1, ∀i. ∀ > 0, ∃M s.t. ∀M ′ ≥M , rM ′ < .
Proof. Let M = 2N ,M ′ = 2N+1 − 1, for some N . We show that rM ′ ≤ 12rM . The corollary follows
by noting that rK′ < rK ∀K ′ > K and that rK <∞, ∀K.
rM − rM ′ = − log tMM−2 + log tM
′
M ′−2
= − log tMM−2 + log
[
1
2
+
1
2
√
tMM−2
]
Lemma C.5
= log
1
2
1
tMM−2
+
1
2
1√
tMM−2

≥ −1
2
log tMM−2
√
tMM−2 ≥ tMM−2
=⇒ rM ′ ≤ 1
2
rM
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Corollary C.2. Suppose g uniform, i.e. gi = 1,∀i. ∀δ > 0, ∃N s.t. ∀M ≥ N , maxk tMk − tMk−1 < δ.
Proof. This corollary follows directly from Corollary C.1. If the rates are upper bounded, then so
are the level differences.
We first find where the rate is minimized given a width between levels of δ
xm = arg min
x
−2 log
[√
(1− x− δ)(1− x) +
√
x(x+ δ)
]
=
1
2
− 1
2
δ
Then given an upper bound of  on the rate, there is a bound on δ determined by the largest possible
difference at levels symmetric around 12 .
rL = −2 log
[
2
√
(
1
2
− δ)(1
2
+ δ)
]
= − log [1− 4δ2]
≥  when δ > 1
2
√
1− e−
Lemma C.6. Suppose g is non-decreasing in θ. Then, tM−2 ≥ 1− 1M−1 .
Proof. Note that, with uniform matching, ∀x ∈ (0, 1], y ∈ [0, 1 − x] the rate with values ti−1 =
y, ti = y+x is no more than the last with tM−2 = 1−x. With width x, in other words, the extreme
points have a larger rates than the middle points. For i /∈ {1,M − 1}:
ri = inf
a
{gi−1KL(a||ti−1) + giKL(a||ti)}
= inf
a
{KL(a||y) + KL(a||y + x)} uniform matching
= −2 log
[
(1− y) 12 (1− y − x) 12 + y 12 (y + x) 12
]
(31)
= − log
[
(1− y)(1− y − x) + y(y + x) + 2 [(1− y)(1− y − x)y(y + x)]1/2
]
≤ − log(1− x)
Where line (31) follows from line (27).
By the proof of Lemma 3.1, the optimal levels equalize the rates between each level. Then, when
g is non-decreasing, gM−2 ≥ g`,∀` ∈ {1 . . .M − 3}. Then, at the same level differences, the rate
corresponding to the last level is no smaller. Thus, to equalize the rates, the last width must be no
larger than any other width. Thus, tM−2 ≥ 1− 1L .
Lemma C.7. With uniform matching (gi = 1), r2
N+1−1 ≥ 15r2
N .
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Proof. Let K = 2N ,K ′ = 2N+1 − 1. Note that tKK−1 ≥ 12 by Lemma C.6.
rK − rK′ = − log tKK−2 + log tK
′
K′−2
= − log tKK−2 + log
[
1
2
+
1
2
√
tKK−2
]
Lemma C.5
= log
1
2
1
tKK−2
+
1
2
1√
tKK−2

≤ log (tKK−2)− 45 12 (tKK−2)−1 + 12 (tKK−2)− 12 ≤ (tKK−2)− 45 when tKK−2 ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
=⇒ rK′ ≥ 1
5
rK
Lemma C.8. With uniform matching (gi = 1), ∃C > 0 s.t. ∀M, tM1 ≥ CM−3.
Proof. By Lemma C.7, ∃C2 > 0 s.t. rM ≥ C25−dlog2Me. Then
− log(1− tM1 ) = rM
≥ C25−dlog2Me
=⇒ tM1 ≥ 1− exp
[
−C25−dlog2Me
]
≥ 1− exp
[
−C3M−
1
log5 2
]
≥ e− 1
e
C3M
− 1
log5 2 e−x ≤ 1− e− 1
e
x for x ∈ [0, 1]
=⇒ ∃C > 0 s.t. tM1 ≥ CM−3
Corollary C.3. With monotonically non-decreasing g, ∃C > 0 s.t. ∀M, tM1 ≥ CM−3.
Proof. The result follows from noting that tM1 with uniform matching lower bounds the first value
with any other monotonically non-decreasing g, which is a direct application of Lemma B.1 – scale
g such that g1 = 1. Then, gj ≥ 1, j > 1 and g0 ≤ 1. Then, the condition of the lemma holds.
Lemma C.9. The run-time of NestedBisection is O(M log2 1δ ), where δ is the bisection grid width
and M is the number of intervals.
Proof. The outer bisection, in main, runs at most log2
2
δ + 1 iterations. Each outer iteration calls
BisectNextLevel M − 3 times, and the inner bisection in each call runs for at most log2 2δ iterations.
Thus the run-time of algorithm is O(M log2 1δ ).
C.6 Proof for Theorem 3.2
Finally, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.2. It follows from formalizing the relationship between δ,
the bisection grid width, and , the additive approximation error in the rate function.
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Proof. Recall M is the number of intervals (levels) in β. We use j, t, t∗ to denote the levels in a
certain iteration, the returned levels, and the optimal levels, respectively. We use r(·) to denote the
individual rates between returned levels, i.e. r(1) = −g1 log(1− t1), r(m) = {gm−1KL(am||tm−1) +
gmKL(am||tm)},m ∈ {2 . . .M −2}, r(M −1) = −gM−2 log(tM−2), and use r∗ to denote the optimal
rate.
By Lemma C.6, t∗M−2 ≥ 1− 1M−1 . By assumption, t∗M−2 < 1− δ. Thus, t∗M−2 ∈ [1− 1M−1 , 1− δ],
the starting interval for the outer bisection.
First, suppose the outer bisection terminates such that tM−2 ≤ t∗M−2 + δ. We prove that this
case always occurs below.
In this case, r∗−r(M−1) is at most−gM−2 log(t∗M−2)+gM−2 log(t∗M−2+δ) = gM−2 log
(
t∗M−2+δ
t∗M−2
)
.
For all m ∈ {M − 2 . . . 2}, in the final CalculateOtherLevels call the algorithm will use bisection to
match the corresponding rate with this last rate, r(M − 1) = −gM−2 log(tM−2), setting tm−2 to the
smallest value such that r(m) ≤ r(M − 1) (i.e. the right end of the final interval is chosen).
Then, ∀m ∈ {M − 2 . . . 2}, r(m) ∈ [r(M − 1) − (δ), r(M − 1)], where (δ) is an upper bound
on the change in the rate functions with a shift of δ in one of the parameters.
For now, assume r(1) = −g1 log(t1) ≥ r(M − 1). We prove that this occurs below. Then,
r(m) ≥ r(M − 1)− (δ) ∀m ∈ {1 . . .M}
≥ −gM−2 log
(
t∗M−2 + δ
)− (δ)
Now we characterize (δ) in the region [t∗1 + δ, t∗M−2 + δ]. In particular, we want to bound the
rate loss from the other levels r(m),m > 1 after the gM−2 log
(
t∗M−2+δ
t∗M−2
)
loss in in r(M − 1). Note
that the only source of error is a level shifting right by δ. rj(·) denotes individual rates between
levels j in an intermediary iteration. Let a′i be the minimum point inside the rate infimum after the
shift by δ.
(δ) = sup
ti−1,ti
[
gi−1KL(ai||ti−1) + giKL(ai||ti)− gi−1KL(a′i||ti−1 + δ)− giKL(a′i||ti)
]
≤ sup
ti−1,ti
[
gi−1KL(a′i||ti−1) + giKL(a′i||ti)− gi−1KL(a′i||ti−1 + δ) + giKL(a′i||ti)
]
ai is inf point
= sup
ti−1,ti
gi−1
[
a′i log
ti−1 + δ
ti−1
+ (1− a′i) log
1− ti−1 − δ
1− ti−1
]
≤ sup
ti−1,ti
gi−1
[
a′i log
ti−1 + δ
ti−1
]
2nd term negative
≤ gM−2
[
log
t∗1 + δ
t∗1
]
tj ≥ t∗1, gj ≤ gM−2
=⇒ r(m) ≥ r∗ − gM−2 log
(
t∗M−2 + δ
t∗M−2
)
− gM−2
[
log
t∗1 + δ
t∗1
]
≥ r∗ − gM−2 δ
t∗M−2
− gM−2 δ
t∗1
log(1 + x) ≤ x
≥ r∗ − δgM−2
[
M − 1
M − 2 +
1
t∗1
]
t∗M−2 ≥ 1−
1
M − 1
By Corollary C.3, ∃C > 0 s.t. t∗1 ≥ CM−3 =⇒ r(m) ≥ r∗ − δgM−2
[
M−1
M−2 + CM
3
]
. Then, let
δ = 
gM−2[M−1M−2+CM3]
. Supposing the algorithm terminates in such an iteration, it finds an -optimal
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β in time O
(
M log2
gM−2[M−1M−2+CM
3]

)
= O
(
M log2 M
)
.
Next, we show that the algorithm only terminates the outer bisection when u ≤ t∗M−2 + δ. The
claim follows from ` ≤ t∗M−2 being an algorithm invariant. The initial ` = 1 − 1M−1 ≤ t∗M−2
by Lemma C.6. ` can only be set to be > t∗M−2 if in the current iteration, jM−2 > t
∗
M−2 and
rj(1) < rj(M − 1). However, if jM−2 ≥ t∗M−2, then rj(1) ≥ rj(M − 1) (jm ≥ t∗m∀m), following
from a shifting argument like that given in Lemma 3.1 and that the inner bisection is such that
rj(m) ≤ rj(M − 1),m ∈ {2 . . .M − 2}, i.e. all the values tm > t∗m. Thus, ` ≤ t∗M−2 is an algorithm
invariant and u > t∗M−2 + δ =⇒ u− ` > δ.
Finally, we show that r(1) ≥ r(M − 1) at the returned {ti}. By assumption, in the initial it-
eration, u ≥ t∗M−2, and recall that the returned {ti} such that tM−2 = u from the final iteration.
As shown in the previous paragraph, jM−2 ≥ t∗M−2 =⇒ rj(1) ≥ rj(M − 1). Thus, if the algorithm
terminates in the first iteration, then r(1) ≥ r(M − 1). In any subsequent iteration, u is changed
only if rj(1) ≥ rj(M − 1) at its new value. Thus, rj(1) ≥ rj(M − 1) is an algorithm invariant, and
r(1) ≥ r(M − 1).
The algorithm terminates in finite time. Thus, it terminates when tM−2 = u ≤ t∗M−2 + δ and
finds a (,M, g)-optimal β in time O
(
M log2 M
)
.
In Theorem 3.2, there is an guarantee of an additive error away from the optimal rate. To
instead have a multiplicative error bound for uniform matching, one can use the lower bound on the
optimal rate from Lemma C.7, ∃C > 0 s.t. r∗ ≥ CM−3. Then, for uniform matching, the algorithm
returns a (1− ) multiplicative approximation in time O (M log2 M ).
C.7 Proof of Theorem B.1
Let βwM denote the optimal β withM intervals for weight function w, with intervals s
wM and levels
twM . Let qwM (θ) = i/M when θ ∈ [swMi , swMi+1 ), i.e. the quantile of interval item of type θ is in.
Then we have the following convergence result for βM .
Theorem B.1. Let g be uniform. Suppose w such that qwM converges uniformly. Then, ∀C ∈
N,∃βw s.t. βw
C2N+1
→ βw uniformly as N →∞.
Proof. Note that the condition on q implies that ∃M s.t. ∀M > M, ∀θ,∃xθ such that θ ∈[
sMbxθMc, s
M
dxθMe
)
.
Let M ′ = 2M − 1,M ′′ = 4M − 3,M q = 2qM − 2q + 1. θ ∈
[
sMbxθMc, s
M
dxθMe
)
=⇒ βM (θ) =
tMbxθMc ∈
[
tMbxθMc−1, t
M
bxθMc+1
]
. Then,
βM ′(θ) = t
M ′
bxθM ′c
= tM
′
bxθ(2M−1)c
∈
[
tM
′
2bxθMc−2, t
M ′
2bxθMc+2
]
⊂
[
tMbxθMc−1, t
M
bxθMc+1
]
Lemma C.5
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And, for general q,
βMq(θ) = t
Mq
bxθ(2qM−2q+1)c
∈
[
tM
q
bxθ2qMc−2q , t
Mq
bxθ(2qM)c+1
]
⊂
[
tM
q
2qbxθMc−2q , t
Mq
2qbxθMc+1
]
⊂
[
tMbxθMc−1, t
M
bxθMc+1
]
Lemma C.5
Then, ∀N ′ > 1, θ: β2N′M−2N′+1(θ) ∈
[
tMbxθMc−1, t
M
bxθMc+1
]
and
|β2N′M−2N′+1(θ)− βM (θ)| ≤ tMbxθMc+1 − tMbxθMc−1
By Corollary C.2, ∀δ > 0,∃K s.t. ∀K ′ > K, tK′bxθK′c+1 − tK
′
bxθK′c−1 < 2δ.
By the Cauchy criterion, ∃β s.t. β(C−1)2N+1 → β uniformly.
By change of variables, ∃β s.t. βC2N+1 → β uniformly.
Corollary C.4. For Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho correlation measures, ∃β s.t. β2N → β
uniformly as N →∞.
Proof. For Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho, {si} is spaced such that ∀i, j, si − si−1 = sj − sj−1.
Thus, xθ = θ meets the criterion.
C.8 Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho related proofs
Definition C.1 (see e.g. Embrechts et al. [12], Nelsen [25]). The population version of Kendall-tau
correlation between item true quality and rating scores is proportional to
W τk , 2
∫
θ1>θ2
Pk(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2
Similarly, given items with qualities θ1, θ2, θ3, the population version of Spearman’s rho correlation
between item true quality and rating scores is
W ρk , 6
∫
θ1>θ2,θ3
Pk(θ1, θ3)dθ1dθ2dθ3
Lemma C.10. Spearman’s ρ can also be written as being proportional to
∫
θ1>θ2
(θ1−θ2)Pk(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2,
i.e. with w(θ1, θ2) = (θ1 − θ2).
Proof. Recall Pk(θ1, θ3) =
Pr((θ1 − θ2)(xk1 − xk3) > 0)
=
∫
θ1>θ2,θ3
Pr(xk1 − xk3 > 0)dθ1dθ2dθ3 +
∫
θ1<θ2,θ3
Pr(xk1 − xk3 < 0)dθ1dθ2dθ3
=
∫
θ1,θ3
Pr(xk1 − xk3 > 0)
[∫ θ1
θ2=0
dθ2
]
dθ1dθ3 +
∫
θ1,θ3
Pr(xk1 − xk3 < 0)
[∫ 1
θ2=θ1
dθ2
]
dθ1dθ3
=
∫
θ1,θ3
[
Pr(xk1 − xk3 > 0)θ1] + Pr(xk1 − xk3 < 0)(1− θ1)
]
dθ1dθ3
=
∫
θ1,θ3
[
Pr(xk1 − xk3 < 0) + θ1
[
Pr(xk1 − xk3 > 0)− Pr(xk1 − xk3 < 0)
]]
dθ1dθ3
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Similarly,
Pr((θ1 − θ2)(xk1 − xk3) < 0) =
=
∫
θ1,θ3
[
Pr(xk1 − xk3 > 0) + θ1
[
Pr(xk1 − xk3 < 0)− Pr(xk1 − xk3 > 0)
]]
dθ1dθ3
=
∫
θ1,θ3
[
Pr(xk3 − xk1 > 0) + θ3
[
Pr(xk3 − xk1 < 0)− Pr(xk3 − xk1 > 0)
]]
dθ1dθ3
Where the second equality follows from θ1, θ3 interchangeable. Then
W ρk = 3
∫
θ1,θ2
(θ1 − θ2)Pk(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2
=
∫
θ1>θ2
6(θ1 − θ2)Pk(θ1, θ2)dθ1dθ2
Note that Spearman’s ρ is similar to Kendall’s τ with an additional weighting for how far apart
the two values that are flipped are.
Lemma C.11. When w is constant, i.e. for Kendall’s τ rank correlation, the intervals s that
maximize (25), ∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)d(θ1, θ2) =
∑
0≤i<j<M
(si+1 − si)(sj+1 − sj) (32)
, are {si = iM }Mi=0.
Lemma C.12. When w is (θ1 − θ2), i.e. for Spearman’s ρ rank correlation, the intervals s that
maximize (25), ∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)d(θ1, θ2) (33)
are {si = iM }Mi=0, i.e. the same as those for Kendall’s τ .
Proof.∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
w(θ1, θ2)d(θ1, θ2) =
∑
0≤i<j<M
∫
θ2∈Si,θ1∈Sj
(θ1 − θ2)d(θ1, θ2)
=
∑
0<i<j≤M
(
sj + sj−1
2
− si + si−1
2
)
(si − si−1)(sj − sj−1)
Finding an asymptotically optimal {si} then is a constrained third order polynomial maximization
problem with M variables. The maximum is achieved at {si = iM }i=Mi=0 , as for Kendall’s tau
correlation.
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